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Parties to arbitration agreements sometimes invoke the
judicial system to litigate collateral issues arising out of the
arbitration process, such as arbitrability of some or all of the
claims, arbitrator bias, and award enforcement or vacatur. When
deciding these collateral issues arising out of securities arbitration,
courts interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).1
This chapter identifies recent decisions by the Supreme Court
under the FAA, as well as selected lower court decisions that could
have an impact on securities arbitration practice.
I.

U.S. Supreme Court

Since PLI published the Arbitration Law Update 2011 last
June, the United States Supreme Court decided three new
arbitration cases, two on arbitrability and one on FAA preemption.
The Court also dismissed a writ of certiorari in one other case that
it had appeared ready to decide.
A. Arbitrability
1. Arbitrability of claims in multi-claim action
In KPMG LLP v. Cocchi,2 in a per curiam opinion, the
Court held that, when faced with a motion to compel arbitration of
a multi-claim lawsuit, courts must compel arbitration of those
claims that are arbitrable even if they find that other claims in the
lawsuit are not arbitrable. In that case, a group of limited
partnership investors sued (among others) the auditor KPMG,
alleging it failed to use proper auditing standards when auditing

1

9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2010). Because securities arbitration necessarily
“involves commerce” (FAA § 2), courts apply the FAA to issues arising
out of securities arbitrations. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
537 U.S. 79 (2002).
2
132 S.Ct. 23 (2011).

2
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the financial statements of the limited partnerships.3 The investors
pled in their complaint four distinct causes of action: negligent
misrepresentation, professional malpractice, aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Florida Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act. KPMG moved to compel
arbitration of all four claims, citing the arbitration clauses in the
auditor services agreement with the partnerships.4
The trial court denied the motion to compel, and the
Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, even though its opinion
suggests that it concluded that only two of the four claims
(negligent misrepresentation and the Florida statutory claim) were
nonarbitrable.5 According to the Supreme Court, the Florida
appellate court’s opinion “indicates a likelihood that [it] failed to
determine whether the other two claims in the complaint
[professional malpractice and aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty] were arbitrable.”6 The Court stated, “when a
complaint contains both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the
Act requires courts to ‘compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable
claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even
where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of
separate proceedings in different forums.’”7 Thus, the Supreme
Court remanded the case back to the Florida Court of Appeal to

3

Id. at 24. The three partnerships at issue were invested with Bernard
Madoff, and ultimately lost millions of dollars. Id.
4
Id. at 25. The arbitration clause provided that “’[a]ny dispute or claim
arising out of or relating to ... the services provided [by KPMG] ...
(including any dispute or claim involving any person or entity for whose
benefit the services in question are or were provided) shall be resolved’
either by mediation or arbitration.” Id. (citing audit services agreement).
5
Id. at 25.
6
Id. at 24.
7
Id. at 26, citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217
(1985).
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determine whether the remaining two claims should be sent to
arbitration.8
While this holding may seem unremarkable, one aspect of
the Cocchi decision raises concern. The Cocchi Court heavily
cited from Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,9 in which it held
that a federal district court must compel arbitration of pendent state
law claims even if the court asserts jurisdiction over the federal
law claims. The Cocchi Court quoted the Byrd Court’s citation to
§§3 and 4 of the FAA and the proposition that “’the Act leaves no
place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead
mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to
arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been
signed.’”10
However, the Supreme Court has never held expressly that
any section of the FAA other than §2 applies in state court, yet it
justified its holding in Cocchi based on the language of FAA §§3
and 4, which presumably did not apply in the Florida state courts.
Byrd came to the Supreme Court through the federal courts, not
state courts, and thus, in that case, the district court and ultimately
the Supreme Court properly applied §§3 and 4 of the FAA. By
citing to this aspect of the Byrd Court’s holding, the Cocchi Court
may have suggested (incorrectly, in my view) that FAA §§3 and 4
apply in state court.
2. Arbitrability of federal statutory claims
The Supreme Court also addressed the arbitrability of
federal statutory claims in the past year. Since its watershed

8

Id. at 26.
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
10
Cocchi,132 S.Ct. at 25-26 (quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218) (emphasis in
original).
9
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decision in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon11 that
federal securities law claims are arbitrable, the Supreme Court has
held consistently that claims arising under federal statutes are
arbitrable as a matter of public policy.
Its January 2012 decision in CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood 12 was no exception. In CompuCredit, the Court
resolved a circuit split and held that claims arising under the Credit
Repair Organizations Act13 are arbitrable. The Ninth Circuit had
decided in the opinion below that Congress intended to preclude
arbitration of claims arising under the CROA, a consumer
protection statute, when it provided consumers with a “right to
sue” violators of prohibitions in the statute.14 Because that Ninth
Circuit decision conflicted with opinions from the Third and
Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve the circuit
split.
The Court, in a 6-3 majority opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, concluded that the CROA’s requirement that credit repair
organizations notify consumers that they “have a right to sue a
credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair
Organization Act” does not reflect Congressional intent to
preclude arbitration of claims arising under the Act.15 The Court
similarly concluded that the Act’s nonwaiver provision does not
preclude the enforcement of an arbitration agreement that waives
the right to bring CROA claims in court.16 These provisions did

11

482 U.S. 220 (1987).
132 S.Ct. 665 (2012).
13
15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq.(“CROA”).
14
Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir.
2010).
15
CompuCredit,132 S.Ct. at 669-70.
16
Id. at 670-71.
12
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not create a consumer’s right to bring a CROA claim in court; it
only created a consumer’s right to receive the statutory notice.17
What is notable about this decision is that consumers
pursue many claims arising under the CROA in class actions, as
they typically are too small for consumers to bring them
individually. Combined with the Court’s endorsement of class
action waivers of consumer protection claims in AT&T Mobility,
LLC v. Concepcion,18 CompuCredit could eliminate the ability of
many consumers to vindicate their CROA statutory rights.
B. FAA Preemption
Another consistent holding in the Supreme Court’s FAA
jurisprudence is that FAA §2 – which declares that agreements to
arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract”19 – preempts state laws that place an arbitration
agreement on unequal footing from other contracts.20
In February 2012, in a per curiam opinion, the Court yet
again held that the FAA preempted a state law. In Marmet Health
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown,21 the Court ruled that the FAA
preempted a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rule that
voided as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
nursing home contracts with respect to negligence claims.
Specifically, the West Virginia high court had held in Brown v.

17

Id.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See infra Part II.A.
19
9 U.S.C. §2. The latter phrase of this section is known as the FAA’s
“savings clause.”
20
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011);
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
21
132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012).
18
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Genesis Healthcare Corp.22 that, “as a matter of public policy
under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home
admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence
that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not be
enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the
negligence.”23 The West Virginia court attempted to distinguish
the Supreme Court’s line of FAA preemption cases by carving out
an exception for negligence claims deriving from personal injury
or wrongful death.
The Supreme Court easily dispensed with the West
Virginia high court’s reading of the FAA, reiterating that the FAA
displaces any state law that outright prohibits the arbitration of a
particular type of claim.24 However, the Court carefully carved out
an option for the state court to apply a contract-neutral state
unconscionability doctrine to void the arbitration agreement. “On
remand, the West Virginia court must consider whether, absent
that general public policy [declaring arbitration clauses in nursing
home contracts unenforceable for negligence claims], the
arbitration clauses in Brown's case and Taylor's case are
unenforceable under state common law principles that are not
specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA.”25
C. Waiver
Last term, it appeared the Court was poised to interpret the
scope of the waiver defense in arbitration: a claim that one party to
an arbitration clause has waived its right to arbitrate based on

22

__ S.E.2d __, 2011 WL 2611327 (W.Va. June 29, 2011).
Marmet, 132 S.Ct. at 1203, citing Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.,
__ S.E.2d __, 2011 WL 2611327 (W.Va. June 29, 2011), App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 11–391, pp. 85a–86a.
24
Marmet,132 S.Ct. at 1203-04.
25
Id. at 1204.
23
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conduct in parallel litigation.26 In Stok & Associates, P.A. v.
Citibank, N.A,27 the Court had agreed to resolve a circuit split over
whether prejudice is a required element of the waiver defense or
just another factor for courts to consider.28 In the opinion below,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Citibank had
not waived its right to arbitrate a claim brought by Stok &
Associates, P.A., because Stok did not make the required showing
of prejudice.29 However, the Court never got a chance to decide
the issue, as the parties settled their dispute as the 2011-12 term
began and the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari.30
II.

Notable Lower Court Decisions
A. FAA Preemption and the fallout from AT&T
Mobility, LLC

One year has now passed since the Supreme Court’s
seminal April 2011decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v.

26

While the waiver test varies slightly among the federal circuits, courts
typically consider factors such as: (1) the time elapsed from
commencement of litigation to the request for arbitration; (2) the amount
and nature of litigation, including substantive motions and discovery; and
(3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., 376 Fed. Appx. 70, 71 (2d Cir.
2010). A recent D.C. Circuit decision illustrates the vitality of the waiver
defense. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we alert the bar in this Circuit that
failure to invoke arbitration at the first available opportunity will
presumptively extinguish a client's ability later to opt for arbitration.”).
27
131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
28
See generally Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari, Stok & Assocs. P.A.
v. Citibank N.A., 2011 WL 63537, *7-14 (Jan. 5, 2011) (explaining that
a majority of circuits (nine) required a showing of prejudice, and a
minority of circuits (three) did not).
29
Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Associates, P.A., 387 Fed. Appx. 921 (11th
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
30
Stok & Assoc., 131 S.Ct. 2955 (2011).
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Concepcion,31 in which it held that the FAA preempts California’s
Discover Bank rule, which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”32 Arbitration
law scholars and practitioners expressed immediate concern that
the decision would preclude consumers from pursuing individual,
low dollar value claims in any forum.
In fact, numerous decisions from states’ high courts postAT&T Mobility reflect unyielding FAA preemption of state law
with respect to the enforceability of arbitration agreements
containing class action waivers.33 Likewise, Professor Sternlight’s
analysis of federal court reaction in the six months after the case
revealed that most decisions applied the AT&T Mobility holding
rigorously, despite there being ample grounds for distinction from
AT&T Mobility.34

31

131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). For a detailed discussion of the case, see Jill I.
Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2011, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION
2011, at 205 (Practising Law Institute 2011).
32
AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1746.
33
See, e.g., State of W.Va., ex rel. Richmond Amer. Homes of W. Va.,
Inc. v. Sanders, 228 W.Va. 125 (2011) (upholding class action waiver in
arbitration clause under AT&T Mobility but declaring clause
unconscionable on other grounds); NAACP of Camden County East v.
Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404 (2011) (upholding class action
waiver but denying motion to compel arbitration on ground that
arbitration provisions lacked mutual assent).
34
See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
Impedes Access to Justice, __ OREGON L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924365, at 6 (concluding that
“most courts are rejecting all potential distinctions and are instead
applying Concepcion broadly as a get out of class actions free card”); see,
e.g., Litmanv. Cellco Partnership, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
that New Jersey law voiding as unconscionable class action waivers in
consumer agreements was preempted by the FAA); Kilgore v. KeyBank
Nat. Ass’n, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 718344 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012) (holding
that the FAA preempts the California doctrine [“Broughton/Cruz”]
prohibiting the arbitration of claims for broad, public injunctive relief).

9

However, a few federal courts have been more willing to
distinguish AT&T Mobility, and strike down a class action waiver
under the "vindicating statutory rights" doctrine.35 Under this
doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.36 that
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federal] statute
[providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function,”37 a disputant can argue that an
arbitration agreement is unenforceable because an unfair aspect of
the arbitration process would preclude that party from vindicating
its statutory rights.38
For example, in In Re American Express Merchants’
Litigation,39 a purported class action arising under the federal
antitrust laws, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered,
in light of AT&T Mobility, its prior decisions that a class action
waiver clause in a credit card agreement was unenforceable under
the FAA40 because “enforcement of the clause would effectively
35

E.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950 (LBS)
(JCF), 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (in a Title VII action,
distinguishing AT&T Mobility and refusing to reconsider its holding that
an arbitration clause was unenforceable because plaintiffs would not be
able to vindicate their statutory rights absent the availability of class
proceedings).
36
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
37
Id. at 637.
38
See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)
(recognizing in dicta that, if a party showed that pursuing its statutory
claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and thus it
could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement).
39
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Amex III”).
40
See In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Amex II”); In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2009) (“Amex I”). The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex I in light of
the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
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preclude any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs’] statutory
rights.”41 The Court of Appeals found that AT&T Mobility did not
alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than that
of AT&T Mobility.42 Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized,
“[h]ere…our holding rests squarely on a ‘vindication of statutory
rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of
arbitrability.’”43 Because plaintiffs in this case demonstrated,
through expert testimony, that pursuing their statutory claims
individually as opposed to through class arbitration would not be
economically feasible, “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the
statutory protections of the antitrust laws,”44 the Court of Appeals
directed the district court to deny defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration.45
Litigants, including administrative agencies tasked with
enforcing consumer and investor protection laws and regulations,
are struggling to find legal means other than the vindicating rights
doctrine to counteract the overpowering preemptive force of the
FAA. One possible argument is that other federal statutes may
trump the FAA and thus limit FAA preemption. For example, the

41

Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304.
Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214 (“What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not
do is require that all class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable.
That leaves open the question presented on this appeal: whether a
mandatory class action waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs
are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be
to preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims.”).
43
Id. at 213, citing Amex I, 554 F.3d at 320.
44
Id. at 217.
45
Id. at 219; see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, __ F.Supp.2d __,
10 Civ. 3332, Slip Copy, 2012 WL 130420 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012)
(reaffirming an earlier invalidation of an employment agreement waiver
that would have precluded putative FLSA collective litigation). A
complete analysis of the broader impact of AT&T Mobility and the
continued vitality of the “vindicating rights” doctrine is beyond the scope
of this article. Suffice it to say that the issues are complex, far from
settled and unpredictably working their way through the courts.
42
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National Labor Relations Board recently concluded that federal
labor law bars class action waivers in labor and employment
contracts.46 Similarly, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s
(SEA) anti-waiver provision may prevent the enforcement of a
class arbitration waiver in the securities context.47
At least one broker-dealer, FINRA member Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc. (“Schwab”), contends that the AT&T Mobility
doctrine applies in the securities context, and, in October 2011,
amended its customer agreement to add a class action waiver to the
arbitration clause.48 The waiver clause forces customers to
agree not to bring or participate in class actions or
class arbitrations against Schwab. Instead, they must bring their
claims “solely in individual capacities.”49
In response, in early 2012, FINRA Enforcement filed a
disciplinary action against Schwab for including the class action
waiver.50 FINRA charges that requiring customers to waive their
right to bring or participate in a class action violates NASD Rule
3110(f)(4)(A) and (C), and its successor rules FINRA Rule
2268(d)(1) and (3) (effective Dec. 5, 2011). Those rules prohibit
member firms from placing “any condition” in a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement that “limits or contradicts the rules of any
46

See D.R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3,
2012).
47
See Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come? 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 107, 12627 (2012).
48
SECURITIES ARBITRATION ALERT 2011-38 (Oct. 12, 2011) (reporting
that Schwab inserted a new clause entitled “Waiver of Class Action or
Representative Action” in its Customer Account Agreements).
49
Id.
50
Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing, Department of
Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No.
2011029760201, available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/ind
ustry/p125516.pdf (FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 1, 2012).
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self-regulatory organization,” and “limits the ability of a party to
file any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules
of the forums in which a claim may be filed under the agreement,”
respectively. FINRA argues that, because Rule 12204(d) of the
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes
addresses the manner in which customers can bring and participate
in class actions against member firms,51 the forum rules clearly
permit class actions, and Schwab’s class action waiver contradicts
Rule 12204.52
To attempt to moot the FINRA enforcement action,
Schwab simultaneously filed an action in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California53 seeking a declaratory
judgment that FINRA “may not enforce its rules regulating brokerdealers in a manner inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act
as most recently interpreted by [the Court’s decisions in AT&T
Mobility and CompuCredit].”54 In its complaint, Schwab argues
that the FAA trumps FINRA’s rules and “the FAA requires
enforcement of class action waivers absent a Congressional
command to the contrary.”55 However, Schwab acknowledges that
FINRA’s rules have the “force of federal law” as they are derived
from the SEA.56 As Professor Barbara Black pointed out,

51

Likewise, Rule 13204 precludes arbitration of intra-industry class
action disputes. See Gomez v. Brill Secs., Inc., 2012 WL 851644 (N.Y.
App. Div., 1st Dept. Mar. 15, 2012) (refusing to compel arbitration of,
inter alia, labor law claims by brokerage firm employees that were
subject of putative class action).
52
Id.
53
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v. FINRA, Complaint for Declaratory and
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, CV 12-0518 (EDL) (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 1, 2012), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/schwab-complaint.pdf.
Interestingly, Schwab offered to pay its customers’ arbitration filing fees
pending the outcome of its suit.
54
Id., “Introduction,” p. 2, lines 6-9.
55
Id., ¶32.
56
Id., ¶33.
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“Schwab fails to acknowlege [sic] (much less address) the
argument that the Securities Exchange Act and its anti-waiver
clause preempt the FAA.”57
Professor Black also updated the procedural status of
Schwab’s case:
On Feb. 21, 2012 Schwab filed a motion for
preliminary injunction, reasserting its arguments. On Feb.
22, FINRA in turn filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, asserting as its principal
argument that Schwab failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies under the Exchange Act. The Exchange Act
establishes a comprehensive system of regulating brokerdealers, including judicial review of FINRA disciplinary
proceedings. Noting the Schwab instituted this judicial
proceeding within hours after the disciplinary complaint
was served, FINRA argues that Schwab failed to meet the
prerequisite for filing a federal law suit -- exhaustion of its
administrative remedies. Moreover, Schwab does
not assert valid reasons for bypassing the disciplinary
proceeding -- either that the disciplinary proceeding is too
time-consuming or that the FINRA and SEC adjudicators
lack the expertise to address issues outside of securities
law or FINRA rules.58
It will be interesting to see whether and how Schwab
defends against the disciplinary action, as it does appear that the
class action waiver provision conflicts with Rule 12204(d).
Moreover, in Schwab’s declaratory judgment action, the district
court should reject the FAA preemption argument here because (1)
57

Barbara Black, “FINRA Seeks to Dismiss Schwab’s Lawsuit
Contesting its Rule Prohibiting Class Action Waivers,” Securities Law
Prof Blog (Feb. 23, 2012).
58
Id.
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FINRA’s Rules are federal law, and FAA preemption operates
only to preempt conflicting state law; and (2) the SEA trumps the
FAA here under the doctrine of implied repeal.59
In addition to applying the Supreme Court’s latest FAA
pronouncements, the federal courts have been busy resolving other
issues arising out of arbitration agreements and proceedings. The
rest of this article will highlight a few of these important decisions
over the past year.
B. Defenses to Arbitrability
Litigation about arbitration often results when one party to
a purported arbitration agreement seeks to compel a reluctant party
to arbitrate a dispute. In response to the motion to compel, the
reluctant party can raise several defenses to the arbitrability of the
dispute, including the absence of an enforceable arbitration
agreement (due to contract law doctrines or, in FINRA arbitration,
the claimant is not a “customer” of respondent), waiver and
release. Discussed below are some recent federal court of appeals
decisions interpreting these defenses.
1. Was there an enforceable arbitration
agreement?
Before a court will grant a motion to compel arbitration
under the FAA, it must be satisfied that the disputing parties
entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. The
Sixth Circuit held that distributing an employee handbook to new
employees that mentions a dispute resolution program does not

59

See Black, supra note 47.
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constitute a binding arbitration agreement, due to lack of mutual
assent.60
However, even if parties did not directly enter into an
arbitration agreement, they may still be able to compel arbitration
of claims arising out of an arbitration agreement between
signatories. A nonsignatory can compel arbitration of related
claims if the claimant alleges the nonsignatory acted as an agent of
a signatory.61 Under those circumstances, the alleged agents may
“invoke the benefit of an arbitration agreement executed by their
principal even though the agents are not parties to the
agreement.”62
2. Who is a “customer” under FINRA Rule
12200?
In a FINRA customer-initiated arbitration, in the absence
of a pre-dispute arbitration clause, respondents may resist
arbitration on the ground that the claimant is not a “customer” of
the FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 12200. That
rule provides that a FINRA member firm must arbitrate a claim if
“requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is between a customer
and a member or associated person of a member; and [t]he dispute
arises in connection with the business activities of the member or
the associated person . . . .”63
The Second Circuit decided two cases in the past year
interpreting FINRA Rule 12200 with opposite outcomes. In the

60

See Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Group, Inc., 656 F.3d 411
(6th Cir. 2011).
61
See Thomas v. Westlake, __ Cal. Rptr. 3d __, 2012 WL 974890 (Cal.
Ct. App. 4th Dist. Mar. 23, 2012).
62
Id. at *5.
63
FINRA R. 12200.
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first case, the Second Circuit decided that an issuer who purchases
auction-facilitating services for its auction rate securities from a
broker-dealer is a “customer” of that broker-dealer within the
meaning of FINRA Rule 12200.64 In the second case, the Court of
Appeals ruled that a hedge fund was not a “customer” of a bank/
broker-dealer for purposes of a dispute arising out of a credit
default swap transaction.65
In the closely-watched first case, in which both the Public
Investors Arbitration Bar Association and the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association filed amici briefs, the Court of
Appeals seemingly opened the door to other disputants who have
business relationships with FINRA member firms that are not
necessarily investment or brokerage relationships to pursue claims
arising out of their relationship in FINRA arbitration.
WVUH is a not-for-profit health consortium that issues
bonds to finance capital improvements and other needs. In the
2000s, it issued several bond offerings (totaling $329 million)
structured as auction-rate securities (ARS), where the bonds’
interest rate is set by periodic Dutch auction.66 UBS Financial
Services served as both the lead underwriter and the broker-dealer
responsible for setting up the auctions.67 After the market for ARS
collapsed in 2008, WVUH filed a FINRA arbitration claim against
UBS alleging fraud in connection with its disclosures about the
ARS market.68

64

See UBS Financial Services Inc. v. West Virginia University Hospitals
Inc., 660 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 2011). The court also decided that FINRA
arbitrators should decide the enforceability of a forum selection clause in
the parties’ arbitration agreement.
65
See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund,
Ltd., 661 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2011).
66
UBS Fin. Servs., 660 F.3d at 645.
67
Id. at 646.
68
Id. at 646-67.
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UBS took the position that WVUH was not its “customer”
under FINRA Rule 12200, and thus it did not have to submit to
arbitration on these claims. It sought an injunction from the
district court, which was denied.69 On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed, and construed FINRA’s Rule 12200 broadly, as it held
that a “customer” is not limited to an investor utilizing investment
or brokerage services of a broker-dealer, but includes any entity
that purchases any services from the broker-dealer.70
In the second case, decided five weeks later, Wachovia
Bank and its affiliated registered broker-dealer Wachovia Capital
Markets (WCM) sought to enjoin a FINRA arbitration brought by
the hedge fund VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund against it
for damages stemming from a credit default swap (CDS)
transaction gone sour.71 WCM argued that VCG was not its
“customer” under FINRA Rule 12200 because it was not a party to
the CDS agreements nor had any of its employees negotiated those
agreements. The district court rejected that argument and ordered
the parties to arbitration.72
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
VCG was not a “customer” of WCM in the disputed transaction.
Distinguishing WVUH, the Second Circuit found that the
undisputed facts established that there was no brokerage agreement
between VCG and WCM, no employee of WCM negotiated the
CDS transaction with VCG, and no WCM employee
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recommended the transaction to VCG.73 The Court stated “where
the parties to the relevant agreements and transactions have
expressly disclaimed any sort of advisory, brokerage or other
fiduciary relationship, there is no need to grapple with the precise
boundaries of the FINRA meaning of ‘customer.’”74
3. Waiver
Along with the issue of whether prejudice is a required
element of the waiver defense (see supra, Part I.C), a federal
appeals court considered whether a litigant’s filing of an amended
complaint revives the opposing party’s previously waived right to
compel arbitration. In Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.,75 the
Eleventh Circuit decided this question as a matter of first
impression.
In Krinsk, a borrower brought a class action against her
lender alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act and other
state laws after the bank terminated her home equity line of credit.
After participating for more than six months in the litigation by,
inter alia, moving to dismiss the complaint, jointly filing a Case
Manangement Report, and opposing a class certification motion,
the bank responded to plaintiffs’ filing of an Amended Complaint
by moving to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause
in the parties’ loan agreement. The district court denied the bank’s
motion to compel arbitration, holding that the bank had waived its
right to arbitration by litigating the original complaint.76
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the order denying
the motion to compel arbitration. Following other circuits that had
addressed this issue, the Court of Appeals held as a matter of first
73
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impression that the filing of an amended complaint can revive a
previously-waived right to compel arbitration if the new pleading
“unexpectedly changes the scope or theory of the plaintiff’s
claims.”77 Since the amended complaint here was a “vast
augmentation of the putative class” and an “unforeseen alteration
in the shape of the class,” the bank “should have been allowed to
rescind its earlier waiver through its prompt motion to compel
litigation.”78
Plaintiff’s counsel beware – think twice before amending a
complaint if you want to remain in court and you are relying on
defendant’s prior waiver of its purported right to compel
arbitration by litigating the original complaint.
4. Release
Another defense to arbitrability is proof that the claims
that otherwise would be arbitrable have been released by a
settlement agreement. In the securities area, claimants may also be
members of a class action involving claims that arguably are
related to the arbitration claims. If the class action has been
settled, may class members proceed with their related claims in an
individual capacity in FINRA arbitration?
The Second Circuit in In re American Exp. Fin. Advisors
Secs. Litig.79 addressed this issue. There, John and Elaine Beland
brought a FINRA arbitration against Ameriprise and Ronald
Miller, an Ameriprise Financial Consultant, alleging various
common law claims stemming from Respondents’ alleged
mismanagement of the Belands’ account and seeking at least
$1,500,000 in damages.80 Ameriprise answered that the Belands’
77
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claims were no longer arbitrable because they had been released by
a settlement of a securities class action in the Southern District of
New York against Ameriprise and other related entities. That class
action alleged various federal and common law claims related to
respondents’ alleged conflicts of interest and misconduct when
providing financial advice to clients.81 The Settlement Agreement
defined “Released Claims” to explicitly exclude “suitability claims
unless such claims are alleged to arise out of the common course
of conduct that was alleged, or could have been alleged.”82 The
Belands had neither opted out of nor claimed a share in the
settlement funds of the class action.83
After the FINRA arbitration panel denied Respondents’
Motion to Stay the arbitration, Respondents moved in the district
court (before the same court that had retained jurisdiction over the
class action) to enforce the Settlement Agreement with respect to
the Belands’ arbitration claims. The district court granted the
Respondents’ motion and ordered the Belands to withdraw their
arbitration.84
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order, in
part. After deciding that the arbitrability of the Belands’ claims
was a matter for a court, not an arbitrator, to decide, the Second
Circuit ruled that (1) the Belands were bound by the class action
settlement agreement; (2) the class action settlement agreement
modified the parties’ pre-existing agreement to arbitrate pursuant
to FINRA rules; (3) any of the Belands’ arbitration claims that
were part of the “Released Claims” in the class action settlement
were no longer arbitrable; and (4) not all of the Belands’
arbitration claims were released by the Settlement Agreement.85
81
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Thus, the Belands were permitted to continue with their
arbitration with respect to unreleased claims – primarily, suitability
claims. Notably, the Belands had not specifically delineated in
their Statement of Claim a claim for “unsuitable
recommendations.” However, the Court of Appeals stated that
“for purposes of this appeal we consider ‘suitability’ to serve more
as a general description of the character of potential common-law
claims (such as breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud,
and negligent misrepresentation—all of which the Belands did
allege in the FINRA proceedings), rather than a technical term
denoting a specific type of section 10(b) claim.”86 Moreover, the
Belands’ suitability claims focused on Respondents’ mismanaging
their accounts contrary to their instructions and investment goals,
whereas the “released” suitability claims stem from Respondents’
alleged “routine practice of ‘steering American Express clients into
[proprietary] funds through one or more managed programs at
American Express.”87 Thus, the Belands’ suitability claims did not
entirely overlap with the Released Claims, and could be arbitrated.
C. Arbitral Misconduct
1. Arbitrator Immunity
In Sacks v. Dietrich,88 the Ninth Circuit held that FINRA
arbitrators were immune from civil liability when they disqualified
the plaintiff from being a party representative in a FINRA
arbitration. The arbitrators had disqualified the representative
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under FINRA Rule 13208, which bars non-attorneys who have
been suspended or barred from the securities industry from
representing parties in FINRA arbitration. The purported party
representative then sued the arbitrators who had signed the
disqualification order in state court for, inter alia, tortious
interference with contract.89
After the case was removed to federal court, the district
court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the case under the
doctrine of arbitral immunity.90 That doctrine provides arbitrators
with immunity from civil liability for “’acts within their
jurisdiction arising out of their arbitral functions in contractually
agreed upon arbitration hearings.’”91 Because the arbitrators
properly interpreted and applied FINRA Rule 13208, plaintiff’s
lawsuit was barred.
2. Arbitrator Selection
In Khan v. Dell,92 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
resolved a matter of first impression and ruled that FAA § 593
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requires a court to appoint a substitute arbitrator when the
arbitrator designated by the parties’ agreement was not available.
In that case, a consumer class action against a computer
manufacturer, the parties’ arbitration agreement had named the
National Arbitration Forum as the forum to administer arbitrable
disputes arising out of the agreement. At the time of the lawsuit,
the NAF was subject to a consent judgment with the Attorney
General of Minnesota that barred it from administering consumer
arbitrations.94 In response to Dell’s motion to compel arbitration,
Khan argued that the designation of NAF as the arbitration forum
was so integral to the arbitration agreement that the unavailability
of the NAF should result in non-enforcement of the arbitration
provision.95
The Third Circuit, acknowledging the issue was one of
first impression in its circuit, surveyed prior decisions in other
jurisdictions, and followed the holdings of those courts that
permitted a court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under FAA § 5
when the designated one was unavailable rather than voiding the
arbitration agreement.96
3. Evident Partiality
Losing parties to arbitration awards can move to vacate the
award under FAA § 10(a)(2) on the ground of “evident partiality”
in the arbitrators. Courts have had difficulty developing a test to
evaluate whether an arbitrator has demonstrated “evident
partiality,” since the Supreme Court’s only decision under that
section is Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co.,97
and that case yielded plurality and concurring opinions that are
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difficult to synthesize. To evaluate a claim of arbitrator bias,
courts look to factors such as:
1. the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary
or otherwise, in the proceeding;
2. the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator
and the person he is alleged to favor;
3. the connection of that relationship to the arbitrator; and
4. the proximity in time between the relationship and the
arbitration proceeding.98
This past year, the Court of Appeals of New York adopted
the Second Circuit’s test for “evident partiality.” In U.S.
Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc.,99 the court held that
“evident partiality ‘will be found where a reasonable person would
have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the
arbitration.’”100 This “reasonable person” standard requires a
showing of something more than a mere appearance of bias, but
not proof of actual bias.101 In U.S. Electronics, the Court of
Appeals declined to vacate the award, stating that “claims of bias,
premised on attenuated matters and relationships, are not
sufficient.”102
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D. Manifest Disregard of the Law
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.103 that parties to an arbitration agreement
cannot contractually expand the judicial grounds of review of an
award under the FAA, the circuit courts have split on whether an
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid
ground to vacate an arbitration award. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.104 The circuit split continues, but the
Tenth Circuit, which previously had expressly declined to address
the issue, did recognize it as a valid ground in the past year.
Currently, the circuits stand on this issue as follows:
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest
disregard” ground of vacatur.105
The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly
ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur
ground.106
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The First Circuit has addressed “manifest disregard”
subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.107
The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly
declined to address the issue.108
E. Attorney’s fees
Two cases this year demonstrate that the courts of appeal
are more than willing to enforce awards of attorney’s fees. In one
case, the Ninth Circuit enforced an attorney’s fees clause in a
customer agreement against a broker-dealer customer.109 In the
underlying arbitration, Bear Stearns successfully sued Wang to
recover an unpaid debt. The district court confirmed the award,
and awarded Bear Stearns attorney’s fees incurred in confirming
the award. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wang’s
argument that the award of attorney’s fees was improper.
Similarly, in an industry employment dispute, a panel of
FINRA arbitrators denied Wachovia’s claims for relief against its
former broker employees and instead awarded the former
employees $1.1 million in attorney’s fees under the South Carolina
Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act.110 Wachovia moved to vacate the
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award on numerous grounds, including the contention that the
panel failed to follow the procedural requirements of the FCPA.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of
the motion to vacate. The Court of Appeals held that the panel
was not required to follow the procedural requirements of the
FCPA, and, even if it was, its failure to follow them did not
manifestly disregard the law.111
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